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Abstract 
 
This article interrogates the extent to which the formal recognition and protection of 
same and different-sex relationships at Strasbourg and in domestic courts has been 
accepted as attracting human rights protection. In order to do so it considers how far 
equality of access to formalised relationship statuses as between same and different-
sex couples has arisen in the ECHR contracting states. Inequality of access—
asymmetry of access—arises, it will be argued, in its most obvious and pernicious 
form in those Eastern contracting states in which different-sex couples who wish to 
live together can access one of two options: cohabitation or marriage, while same-sex 
couples are confined to cohabitation only. But a form of asymmetry also arises in 
states which have introduced registered partnerships for same-sex couples, leaving 
availability of marriage only to different-sex ones. Other forms of asymmetry of 
access are also explored. This article argues for taking further steps towards creation 
of symmetry of access to formal relationship statuses in Member States on human 
rights grounds, but also pragmatically, in order to strengthen the consensus in the 
contracting states on this matter, and therefore place the Strasbourg Court more 
clearly at the forefront of addressing the inequalities thereby arising, where Member 
States have so far failed to do so. 
 
Introduction 
 
This article interrogates the extent to which the formal recognition and protection of 
same and different-sex relationships at Strasbourg and in domestic courts has been 
accepted as attracting human rights protection. In order to do so it considers how far 
equality of access to formalised relationship statuses as between same and different-
sex couples has arisen in the ECHR contracting states. Inequality of access—
asymmetry of access—arises, it will be argued, in its most obvious and pernicious 
form in those "Eastern" contracting states1 in which different-sex couples who wish to 
live together have available two options: marriage or cohabitation, while same-sex 
couples are confined to cohabitation only (and even that option may not 
be*E.H.R.L.R. 545  an effective one in certain states).2 But a form of asymmetry also 
arises in states which have introduced registered partnerships3 for same-sex couples, 
leaving the availability of marriage only to different-sex couples. Other forms of 
asymmetry also arise, as will be explored. 
 
In furtherance of the argument that forms of asymmetry of access to formal 
relationship statuses (hereafter "asymmetry of access") should be more fully and 
clearly recognised as creating rights-violations, this article will argue that the 
dominant—but not the only—value underpinning the introduction of same-sex 
registered partnerships and/or same-sex marriage in Member States is and should be 
that of creating equality as between same and different-sex couples. The difficulty of 
relying on the Strasbourg Court to advance equality in this respect will be outlined: 
adjudicating in an increasingly nationalistic context, it has sought, as will be argued, 
enhanced reliance on devices enabling it to express self-restraint,4 most obviously the 
margin of appreciation doctrine, influenced by analysis of the changing acceptance of 
same-sex registered partnerships and marriage in the Member States (consensus 
analysis).5 It will therefore be contended that incrementally discarding asymmetry of 
access to formal relationship statuses based in effect on sexual orientation6 in Member 
States could in turn influence the stance taken at Strasbourg when it considers 
challenges to such asymmetry. 
 
This article will proceed as follows. Part 1 will briefly sketch a picture as to the 
refusal thus far to introduce formalisation of same-sex unions in some Eastern 
Member States, and as to the introduction of same-sex registered partnerships, and 
marriage, predominantly in a range of Western Member States. It will consider the 
resultant creation of asymmetry of access to relationship statuses in certain Member 
States. Part 2 will evaluate the contribution of Strasbourg to the creation of greater 
symmetry of access to formal relationship statuses as between same and different-sex 
couples under art.8(1) of the ECHR, either read alone or with art.14, looking in 
particular at the factors appearing to limit the Court’s deployment of its evolutive 
approach in this context, which are likely to be linked to resistance to introducing 
same-sex registered partnerships or marriage in most Eastern Member States. Part 3 
will consider the judicial treatment of the Strasbourg jurisprudence in the litigation in 
three recent cases on asymmetry of access to formalisation of relationship statuses, 
from the United Kingdom, Austria and Russia, focusing in particular on their 
implications for future challenges at Strasbourg from states where no means of 
formalising a same-sex union is available. Part 4 will analyse the potential 
implications of the Strasbourg jurisprudence for challenges to asymmetry of access in 
domestic courts, while Part 5 will consider the implications of creating symmetry of 
access by abolishing registered partnerships once same-sex marriage is introduced in 
a state. 
 
1. Same-sex marriage and registered partnerships in the contracting states 
 
It will be found below that equality-based arguments have strongly influenced the re-
shaping of state recognition of same-sex relationships in a large number of the 
Member States. This article will attempt to do no more than present a brief sketch as 
to the position in the Member States as to formalised relationship statuses, a position 
that has changed with dramatic rapidity over the last decade, and is continuing 
to*E.H.R.L.R. 546 change.7 A majority of the contracting states have now introduced 
same-sex registered partnerships,8 while a number of the Western European 
contracting states have introduced same-sex marriage, predominantly over the last 
five years.9 Among Eastern states, Croatia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary have established registered partnership schemes for same-sex couples. 
Estonia also introduced such a scheme, but with coverage for both same and different-
sex couples.10 
 
When in a number of states registered partnerships acquired a well-established and 
recognised relationship status, their bans on same-sex marriage came under increasing 
pressure as creating discrimination against same-sex couples, given the discriminatory 
impact of the ghettoisation of formal relationships based on sexual orientation. 
Pressure to introduce same-sex marriage also arose when registered partnership 
schemes were not well-established or recognised so that the schemes were criticised 
as "consolation prizes".11 Certain Member States—Denmark, Norway, Sweden, 
Iceland, Finland, Ireland and Germany—used to provide for registered partnerships in 
the case of same-sex unions, but they were phased out following the introduction of 
same-sex marriage.12 But a number of Member States that introduced same-sex 
marriage also retained registered partnerships for both same and different-sex 
couples.13 
 
In certain Eastern states Bills have been brought forward to introduce same-sex 
registered partnerships, but have not passed. In 2012 a registered partnership Bill was 
submitted to the Slovakian Parliament but was refused a second reading by a large 
majority14; however, public opposition to formal recognition of same-sex unions 
appears to be weakening.15 In 2015 a Bill was put forward in Latvia to modify the 
Civil Code to provide for registered partnerships.16 The proposed law would have 
allowed "any two persons" to register their partnership and thereby they would have 
acquired almost the same rights and obligations as married couples, but the proposal 
was rejected.17 Bulgaria considered adding different-sex and same-sex couples to its 
Family Code in 2012 but has not so far done so. A package of proposed constitutional 
reforms is currently before the Ukrainian parliament and includes a proposal for 
same-sex unions,18 but the proposal is opposed by the All-Ukrainian Council of 
Churches and Religious Organizations. In 2015 the Legal Committee of the 
Romanian Chamber of Deputies considered a legislative proposal aimed at legalising 
same-sex registered partnerships, the third proposal of that kind introduced in less 
than three*E.H.R.L.R. 547  years, but it was rejected. Three draft laws on gender-
neutral registered partnerships have been considered so far in the Polish legislature, 
but none have yet passed into law.19 
 
Only one of these Eastern states has introduced same-sex marriage. Indeed, many of 
these states have amended their constitutions to ensure marriage is defined as a union 
between one man and one woman.20 Slovenia’s National Assembly passed a same-sex 
marriage Bill in March 2015, the first post-Communist state to do so, but the measure 
was not enforced since a civil society group backed by the Catholic Church, "Children 
Are At Stake", brought a challenge to it to Slovenia’s highest court. The Court agreed 
with the challenge, overturning the law, and deciding that the measure must be the 
subject of a referendum scheduled for December 2015; by a majority Slovenians 
rejected the measure on the basis that it included same-sex adoption.21 Thereafter the 
Bill was brought into law in February 2017, but without including provision for such 
adoption. 
 
In terms of providing equal access to formal relationship statuses to same and 
different-sex couples, a number of conclusions can be drawn. A few states offer 
complete symmetry of access in the sense of providing equal availability of 
relationship statuses to same and different-sex couples: registered partnerships and 
marriage are open to both.22 Somewhat more circumscribed symmetry of access is 
also apparent in those states which offer couples, regardless of sexual orientation, 
availability of only one formalisation—marriage. Availability of marriage alone 
arguably creates greater detriment for same-sex couples than for different-sex ones 
since same-sex couples may have stronger objections to contracting marriage, a point 
pursued below; therefore a larger number of such couples may have no effective 
option open to them of formalising their relationship. Further, if registered 
partnerships are phased out, after some same-sex couples had already contracted 
them, those couples with ideological objections to contracting marriage would be left 
as a diminishing group of persons in a "legacy relationship".23 
 
The majority of states provide asymmetry of access in four forms. First, and of most 
concern, in a number of Eastern states different-sex couples can choose to access 
marriage over cohabitation; same-sex couples have no such choice.24 Second, and 
leaving aside the option of cohabitation, in a number of states different-sex couples 
can access marriage or a registered partnership, while same-sex couples can only 
access a registered partnership.25 Third, in a small number of states—England and 
Wales,26 and Scotland27 —same-sex couples can access marriage or a registered 
partnership, while different-sex couples can only access marriage. Fourth, certain 
states offer the availability of marriage to different-sex partners and of a registered 
partnership to same-sex ones.28 That stance could be referred to as providing 
partial*E.H.R.L.R. 548  symmetry of access, since only one option of formalisation is 
available to all couples, but, clearly, it does not provide in substance a satisfactory 
equality of access, given that the legal consequences and the civic benefits conferred 
by such partnerships do not necessarily mirror those available via contracting 
marriage, and marriage tends to be viewed as the more privileged status.29 The extent 
to which the level of benefits accruing to persons in a registered partnership is similar 
to those accruing via marriage varies from state to state, and is beyond the scope of 
this article.30 In some states such partnerships are viewed as an institution equal to 
marriage since, with a few exceptions, their legal consequences and the civic benefits 
conferred largely mirror those resulting from civil marriage,31 and a partnership may 
be viewed as "marriage in all but name".32 But in terms of the formalisation 
ceremony, the terminology used, and the treatment of the sexual relationship between 
the partners, a contradictory emphasis on creating differentiation between registered 
partnerships and marriage has sometimes emerged.33 
 
The creation of asymmetry of access in states in the first sense is clearly of the 
greatest concern since it obviously means that same-sex couples who wish to 
formalise their relationship are denied the civic benefits and recognition inherent in 
such formalisation. It also strongly reinforces cultural acceptance of homophobia and 
the notion that homophobia should be accorded legal recognition. But the other 
failures to create symmetry of access mean that inequality is also perpetuated in other 
respects, most obviously where both same and different-sex couples can access a 
registered partnership, but only different-sex couples can access marriage. Not only is 
equality of access denied to same-sex couples, but the level of civic benefits may be 
lower as well. Since it can hardly be doubted that couples suffer the most severe form 
of discrimination if unable to access any form of formalisation of their union, this 
article turns to consider the likelihood of a challenge to that position succeeding at 
Strasbourg. But it also considers, more generally, the Strasbourg position so far on the 
creation of asymmetry of access to relationship statuses. 
 
2. Addressing forms of asymmetry of access at Strasbourg 
 2.1 Strasbourg self-restraint due to the doctrine of subsidiarity 
 
The Strasbourg "family life" jurisprudence is permeated by an acceptance that if 
couples fall within the category of the "family" that can and should lead to conferment 
of some societal benefits, and also that formalisation of the "family" relationship 
would tend to carry with it an enhanced level of benefits, so such formalisation should 
not be withheld on the ground of sexual orientation. Reliance on discerning a 
consensus in the contracting states as to formalisation of relationships is a marked 
feature of the Strasbourg*E.H.R.L.R. 549  jurisprudence34 bearing on same-sex 
marriage and registered partnerships35 and affecting the width of the margin of 
appreciation granted to the state.36 In turn its width determines the level of scrutiny 
deployed in the proportionality analysis, so the use of consensus analysis is of 
particular pertinence in relation to claims of discrimination under art.14,37 especially 
relevant in this context: if a form of consensus on the matter can be discerned, then it 
has been accepted under art.14 that especially weighty reasons must be 
advanced,38 justifying the measure creating differentiation if certain grounds of 
discrimination are at stake, including sexual orientation and gender.39 Clearly, this 
cautious approach to exercising its living instrument tradition in this context is linked 
to the Court’s position as a regional guardian of human rights without (in practice) 
coercive legal powers, meaning that it inevitably relies on subsidiarity-related 
devices, especially in contested social contexts. 
 
2.2 Recognising the value of state formalisation of relationships 
 
Strasbourg accepted in X and Y v United Kingdom 40 that once a relationship could be 
identified as a representing a form of "family life"—in that instance in respect of 
different-sex cohabitants—a state would be entitled to accord it greater protection; the 
Commission further decided that a state was entitled to decide to afford particular 
assistance to "traditional" families. The Court then extended the category of 
relationships that could fall within the term "family" in Schalk and Kopf,41 noting that 
so far its case-law under art.8 had only accepted that the "emotional and sexual 
relationship" of a same-sex couple would constitute "private life", but it had not found 
that it would constitute "family life".42 But given that recently a rapid evolution in the 
concept of "family" in Member States had occurred, and bearing certain EU 
Directives relating to the family in mind, the Court found that the "relationship of the 
applicants, as a cohabiting same sex couple living in a stable de facto partnership, 
would fall within the notion of ‘family life’, just as the relationship of a different sex 
couple in the same situation would"43 since the applicant couple was in a relevantly 
similar situation to a different-sex couple as regards their need for "legal recognition 
and protection of their relationship".44 It is notable that in so finding the Court did not 
require the couple to point to a specific detriment that had accrued to them, or was 
likely to accrue, due to the*E.H.R.L.R. 550  lack of formal recognition of their 
relationship as a "family" in terms of loss of civic benefits or of formal signalling of 
their relationship status. 
 
Schalk can readily be characterised as a challenge based on the asymmetry of access 
to relationship statuses available to same and different-sex couples in Austria at the 
time. The main complaint in Schalk under arts 12 or 8 read with art.14 was as to the 
inability of the same-sex partners to access marriage,45 but that argument was rejected 
on the basis of the lack of consensus as to same-sex marriage in the contracting states, 
meaning that the decision to bar same-sex couples from marriage fell within Austria’s 
margin of appreciation. The applicants in Schalk also raised the issue of differences 
between a marriage and a registered partnership, arguing that such partnerships did 
not provide the same level of civic benefits and recognition as did marriage.46 That 
argument was rejected under art.14 read with art.8 on the basis that registered 
partnerships offered a level of protection which was found to fall within the state’s 
margin of appreciation, given the trend in Europe to accord benefits to registered 
partnerships differing only slightly, aside from parental rights, from those available 
for marriages.47 
 
Relying on the step taken in Schalk, the applicant couples in Vallianatos v 
Greece,48 who were in stable same-sex relationships, relied on art.8 read with art.14 to 
challenge their exclusion in Greece from civil unions which were only available to 
different-sex couples. A strong version of asymmetry of access had been created, 
given that different-sex couples in Greece could choose marriage or a registered 
partnership; both options were denied to same- sex couples. The Court’s analysis of 
the European consensus found that an evolving or "minority" consensus was currently 
emerging with regard to the introduction of forms of legal recognition of same-sex 
relationships, in the sense that where contracting states did authorise a form of 
registered partnership other than marriage only two states had reserved it exclusively 
to different-sex couples.49 Thus a narrow margin of appreciation only was accorded to 
Greece. The Court found that the applicants’ relationships would fall within the 
notions of both "private" and "family" life under art.8(1), and found that art.14 
applied50 since the applicants were in a comparable situation to different-sex couples 
as regards "their need for legal recognition and protection of their relationship"—as 
established in Schalk.51 In determining whether the situation of the applicants fell 
within the ambit of art.8, the Court made no reference to detriment accruing to them 
due to their exclusion from the civil union scheme, but merely reiterated the points 
made in Schalk as to the ability of same-sex couples like different-sex ones, to enjoy 
"family life". While the key point established in Vallianatos was clearly that a state 
that excludes same-sex couples from an existing civil union scheme will be found to 
have discriminated against them on grounds of sexual orientation, the Court also 
emphasised the recognition value of any such scheme,52 implying that formal 
recognition in itself conferred a benefit.53 Obviously the Grand Chamber was 
addressing a situation in which no formal recognition at all for their relationships was 
available in Greece, so it did not have to address the question of the nature of the 
recognition or of choice over it.*E.H.R.L.R. 551  
 
The seminal decision in Oliari v Italy 54 went one step further than the Court had done 
in Vallianatos: it was the first case to establish that failure to afford couples 
constituting family life access to a statutory framework offering recognition and 
protection of their relationship could lead to a breach of art.8 on grounds of 
disproportionality, where the only scheme available offering such benefits was 
marriage, open only to heterosexual couples. So, clearly, it differed 
from Vallianatos which concerned exclusion from an existing registered partnership 
scheme. The Court referred to a "thin majority" of Member States (24 out of 47) that 
had by 2015 already legislated to introduce forms of same-sex registered partnership; 
therefore the margin of appreciation conceded was narrow. It found that cohabitation 
agreements, which appeared to be available to same-sex couples were designed only 
to provide certain rights to people who lived together, including flatmates, and were 
not intended explicitly to provide any legal rights aimed at couples.55 
 
In finding a breach of art.8 the Court noted that the Italian courts had found that same-
sex unions should be protected as a form of social community under art.2 of the 
Italian Constitution and, in relation to Italy’s positive obligations, that there was "a 
conflict between the social reality of the applicants, who for the most part live their 
relationship openly in Italy, and the law, which gives them no official 
recognition".56 Thus, while recognising a positive obligation on states to introduce 
same-sex registered partnerships under art.8 of the ECHR 57 the Court sought to relate 
its scope to circumstances arising locally, in Italy, and most likely to arise in Western 
European states. Further, while according value to such partnerships, it also accepted 
the continuance of asymmetry of access: it declared the claim of the couple to a same-
sex marriage under art.12 inadmissible,58 clearly signalling that it would not recognise 
a right to such marriage until the consensus on the matter had strengthened 
considerably, and the Court refused to accept a form of minority consensus.59 
 
Since argument concentrated on Italy’s positive obligations under art.8, the Court, 
having found a breach, declined to consider the matter separately under art.14. In 
contrast, in Taddeucci v Italy 60 where a partner of a same-sex couple, a non-EU 
citizen, would have been able to remain in Italy if able to marry his partner, a breach 
of art.14 read with art.8 was found, recognising the discriminatory dimension of the 
detriment caused to him. 
 
2.3 Accepting asymmetry of access to formal relationship statuses 
 
Acceptance of asymmetry of access was impliedly apparent in Hämäläinen v 
Finland 61 in a somewhat different context, concerning a transsexual applicant; the 
case turned on the question whether there was a positive obligation under art.12 or 
art.8(1) to introduce same-sex marriage, bearing in mind that the applicant wanted full 
recognition of her new gender and continuance of her marriage. A form of 
formalisation of her relationship was available—a registered partnership—but 
accessing that status involved relinquishing her marriage, and she objected to so doing 
on religious grounds. On that basis no such obligation was found since the state was 
found to have remained within its margin of appreciation in requiring transsexuals 
whose marriage had become a same-sex one after gender reassignment, to relinquish 
it.*E.H.R.L.R. 552  62 
 
While the Court has accepted in this jurisprudence that providing state recognition for 
a relationship by according it a formal means of expression may be required by art.8, 
it has not accepted that the choice of the form of the recognition is significant: the 
Court has made it clear that if a couple can already choose one recognised form of 
formalised relationship aimed specifically at couples in a committed relationship, a 
state will not be in breach of art.8, either read alone or with art.14, if it does not allow 
them to choose another form.63 The form of recognition that has been sought by a 
number of same-sex couples in the decisions discussed is marriage, and the Court has 
consistently opposed accepting that a right to same-sex marriage arises under arts 8 or 
12 read with art.14, or alone64 on the basis of the particular, culturally specific, nature 
of marriage65and, as mentioned, on grounds of consensus analysis influencing the 
width of the margin of appreciation. Although post-Oliari the consensus is continuing 
to strengthen, it remains a trend/minority consensus, which the Court refused to 
accept as able to narrow the margin in Oliari. 
 
The decisions discussed leaving undisturbed the exclusion of same-sex couples from 
marriage in certain states were taken in the context of the "deep-rooted social and 
cultural connotations [of marriage] which may differ largely from one society to 
another",66 leading the Court to prefer to find that a formalised union could be made 
available to applicants under art.8 in the form of less culturally specific registered 
partnerships. Therefore, those decisions did not address the value of making a choice 
available as to the recognised public expression of the union. The Strasbourg cases 
discussed, in particular Schalk and Oliari, support the conclusion that at present so 
long as one method of formalisation of a same-sex or different-sex union is made 
available to couples by the state, which is targeted specifically at couples in a sexual 
relationship, and is not merely of symbolic value, the state’s positive obligations 
under art.8 read alone or with art.14 would be likely to be found to be fulfilled, in the 
sense that the state in question would therefore be deemed to have remained within its 
margin of appreciation. The fact that couples are not allowed access to one of the 
methods on grounds of sexual orientation is not deemed to be discriminatory, even 
where there are significant differences between the two. 
 
3. Directly challenging asymmetry of access to formal relationship statuses under 
the ECHR 
 
3.1 The strengthening consensus on the introduction of same-sex registered 
partnerships and marriage 
 
Given that post-Oliari the introduction of same-sex marriage/registered partnerships 
will continue to grow in Europe, and states that have introduced those statuses will 
soon be in a clearer majority, it would be expected that the Court’s analysis of the 
consensus would change in future. As further states move towards rejecting 
asymmetry of access, and either phase out registered partnerships, or potentially open 
them to different-sex couples after introducing same-sex marriage, the consensus as to 
creating symmetry of access in Council of Europe states will strengthen. Although the 
Court in the decisions discussed has acquiesced in accepting asymmetry of access to 
formalisation of relationships where registered partnerships are available to same-sex 
couples, if a consensus builds in the contracting states to the effect that creating or 
maintaining such asymmetry is unacceptable, the Court would eventually come under 
pressure to accept that it creates discrimination against same-sex couples, since 
weighty reasons would then have to be adduced to justify the differentiation. As a 
result, the Court will eventually come under greater pressure*E.H.R.L.R. 553  to 
oblige individual states to introduce same-sex registered partnerships even where 
local social acceptance of such partnerships is not apparent. In respect of same-sex 
marriage, the margin of appreciation accorded to individual states may also eventually 
narrow.67 
 
Given the Court’s current stance in refusing to acknowledge a right to same-sex 
marriage under the ECHR, reliance on arts 8 and 14 to prompt a state to open 
marriage to same-sex couples would fail at present at Strasbourg, and probably also in 
domestic courts, under those articles or their domestic equivalents, although the 
chances of a successful claim domestically in certain states could be higher, a point 
pursued below. Therefore, addressing asymmetry of access to formalisation of 
relationships as between same and different-sex couples by way of the introduction of 
same-sex marriage in a number of contracting states has occurred instead via 
legislation, and that may continue to be the case in future. However, litigation is now 
arising in certain Member States, relying on the Strasbourg jurisprudence discussed, 
challenging such asymmetry of access but, in two instances discussed below, based 
on challenges brought by different-sex couples. As discussed further below, such 
litigation arguably has merit on its own terms, but it could also be seen in effect as a 
proxy for a direct challenge to the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage in 
particular states, given that it relies on seeking to eliminate acceptance of 
discrimination based on sexual orientation as determinative of access to formal 
relationship statuses. In the third instance the challenge is to the complete exclusion 
of same-sex couples from a means of formalising their union. 
 
3.2 Asymmetry of access in England and Wales: Steinfeld 
 
The anomalous situation that has arisen in England and Wales68 whereby same-sex 
couples can access marriage or a civil partnership, but different-sex ones in the same 
position can only access marriage, gave rise to the challenge in Steinfeld by the two 
claimants, a couple in a committed long-term heterosexual relationship, with a child. 
They are challenging their exclusion from the choice of a civil partnership,69 since 
they are barred, as a different-sex couple, from entering that status under the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004.70 The claimants were seeking to formalise their relationship, 
but did not want to marry due their strong ideological objections to the institution of 
marriage, on the basis of their view that it is imbued with historical patriarchal 
trappings. They view the civil partnership status as a formalisation of their 
relationship which reflects their values and recognises the equality of their 
relationship. In pursuit of their claim they sought to rely on arts 8 and 14 of the ECHR 
in the High Court71 and then in the Court of Appeal, under the Human Rights Act, 
basing their claim on a number of the Strasbourg decisions discussed, and arguing 
that they are being discriminated against under art.14 on grounds of their sexual 
orientation since a same-sex couple could choose to contract marriage under 
the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, but would also have the choice of 
entering a civil partnership. 
 
The Court of Appeal found unanimously, relying on Oliari, that the barrier to access 
of different-sex couples to civil partnerships fell within the ambit of art.8.72 Lady 
Justice Arden noted that in Oliari the Strasbourg Court had "specifically rejected the 
argument that … the applicants had to show that they*E.H.R.L.R. 554  suffered any 
loss as a result of not being able to enter a civil union"73 in order to fall within that 
ambit.74 Clearly, the applicants in Oliari had suffered detriment—but that was not 
part of the ambit argument. The Court, taking account of Vallianatos as to ambit, also 
rejected the argument that the availability of marriage to the applicants would take 
them outside that ambit, finding that the Strasbourg Court would equally reject the 
"can marry" submission on the basis that marriage would not be "an effective option 
for them", given their settled beliefs.75 
 
Once the situation was found to fall within the ambit of the "family life" head of 
art.8(1), art.14 was also engaged. Therefore the Court had to consider whether the 
differentiation between same and different-sex couples—the asymmetry of access 
created—could be justified. The Court accepted that if the differential treatment was 
on grounds of sexual orientation or gender—then, 
following Schalk (and Vallianatos with a range of other decisions, including Karner v 
Austria,76 Hämäläinen v Finland), weighty reasons would be needed to justify it. The 
standard to be applied in considering justification was found to be that of strict 
scrutiny, even if at Strasbourg a wide margin of appreciation would have been granted 
to the state.77 (Possibly it would not in any event have been wide since England and 
Wales are outliers in Europe, given that most other states do not create the same form 
of asymmetry of access between couples.) The Secretary of State’s aim was to wait to 
see what the impact of the introduction of same-sex marriage would be on civil 
partnerships; the measure taken to further it was to continue to exclude different-sex 
couples from civil partnerships without giving the appellants (and other couples in 
their position) any means of knowing "when their state of uncertainty as to 
formalisation of their relationship might end".78 Lady Justice Arden found under strict 
scrutiny that the justification given failed the test of proportionality.79 
 
Lord Justice Beatson and Lord Justice Briggs, however, both came to the conclusion, 
even under strict scrutiny, that the "wait and see" policy justified the potential 
discrimination under art.14 on the basis that a change should not be made 
prematurely—that is, by extending civil partnerships to different-sex couples, which 
might have to be reversed, wasting time and effort.80 Lord Justice Beatson found that 
resolution of the position was complex and would need time to resolve.81 He did, 
however, consider that while the Court should not micro-manage areas of social 
policy, and therefore a deadline for eliminating the discrimination by taking one of 
the available options should not be set, there would come a point at which a court 
would not accept that the "wait and see" policy remained justifiable. Lord Justice 
Briggs agreed.82 
 
It is argued that the majority in the Court of Appeal erred in finding that there were 
weighty reasons which could justify the differentiation. In Vallianatos the demand for 
weighty reasons meant that proportionality demands under art.14 were not found to 
require merely that the measure chosen was in principle suitable to achieve the aim in 
question (protecting heterosexual unions outside marriage): it also had to be shown to 
be necessary to achieve that aim to exclude same-sex couples from the category of 
registered partnerships. It was found in Taddeucci v Italy 83 that that was particularly 
the case "where rights falling within the scope of Article 8 are concerned". 
 
If the Government’s aim was to obtain time to consider the future of civil 
partnerships, the measure taken could not be said to have been "necessary" to achieve 
it since it would have been possible to allow different-sex couples access to civil 
partnerships while consulting as to their future. At the least, it could not be said to 
have been necessary to offer no timetable regarding the consultation, as Lady Justice 
Arden*E.H.R.L.R. 555  pointed out. On that basis, the difference of treatment could 
have been found to be unjustified and therefore discriminatory under art.14. Thus, in a 
move which would outpace Strasbourg on this matter,84 a breach of art.8 read with 
art.14 could be found when the case reaches the Supreme Court, which would 
probably lead to a declaration of the incompatibility between those articles 
and ss.1 and 3(1)(a) of the Civil Partnership Act 2004,85 meaning that the government 
might take the option of opening civil partnerships to different-sex couples, although 
it could possibly also abolish them completely, as discussed below. 
 3.3 Asymmetry of access in Austria: Ratzenböck and Seydl 
 
Strasbourg has very recently decided on a similar case, also brought by a different-sex 
couple denied access to a registered partnership—Helga Ratzenböck and Martin Seydl 
v Austria.86 Such partnerships were introduced in Austria in 2010, but confined to 
same-sex couples, while same-sex marriage has not yet been introduced.87 Thus the 
differentiation does not arise on the basis that a same-sex couple would have two 
options as to choice of relationship status while a different-sex couple would only 
have one, but rather because the couple is being denied the option, purely on the 
grounds of sexual orientation, of entering a particular formal relationship status (the 
fourth form of asymmetry of access delineated above). That status is the only 
effective option for them, given their ideological objection to marriage. Like Steinfeld 
and Keidan, the couple in question have a child and are in a committed relationship, 
but do not want to marry. 
 
Ratzenböck and Seydl consider that a registered partnership would suit and express 
their relationship much more readily than would marriage. That is partly because in 
Austria registered partnerships entail shorter waiting-periods for dissolution than are 
available for divorce; there is no obligation for the partners to be monogamous; 
instead there is a duty to commit to a comprehensive relationship of trust. There are, 
however, numerous instances of discrimination against registered as opposed to 
married partners, relating to the care for children. But other considerations outweigh 
that one. 
 
The couple lodged an application to enter into a registered partnership pursuant to the 
Registered Partnership Act (Eingetragene Partnerschaft-Gesetz), arguing that limiting 
the application of this law to same-sex couples violated their constitutional right to be 
treated equally before the law, pursuant to art.2 of the Basic Law (Staatsgrundgesetz), 
art.7 of the Federal Constitution (Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz), arts 12, 8 and 14 of the 
ECHR, and art.21 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Austrian 
Constitutional Court dismissed their claim.88 It reiterated that art.12 of the ECHR had 
been found to apply only to the traditional civil marriage between a woman and a 
man. Since Strasbourg in Schalk had held that there currently was no consensus 
among the Member States concerning marriage for same-sex couples, and that issue 
therefore fell within the margin of appreciation left to the Member States, that must, it 
found, be even more clearly the case in respect of the question of access of different-
sex couples to a registered partnership, since only a very small number of Member 
States made such provision. 
 
Pursuant to the jurisprudence of the Court, it was noted that in general very weighty 
reasons had to be brought forward in order to justify a difference in treatment based 
on gender or sexual orientation. However,*E.H.R.L.R. 556  in Schalk the Court had 
held that the legislator was allowed to limit civil marriage to different-sex couples, 
because the state would dispose of a certain margin of appreciation concerning the 
exact status to accord to an alternative institution applicable to same-sex couples, and 
had indicated that that margin would apply to a state decision to create asymmetry of 
access to formal relationship statuses as between same and different-sex couples. The 
Constitutional Court therefore concluded that art.8 read with art.14 did not grant the 
couple a right to conclude a registered partnership. That was partly on the basis of a 
lack of a European consensus on the matter of opening registered partnerships to 
different-sex couples. But the Court also took into account the fact that the institution 
of civil marriage was open to such couples, who were not part of an historically 
disadvantaged, vulnerable, discriminated-against group, while the institution of the 
registered partnership was created in order to counteract discrimination against same-
sex couples. 
 
The couple brought their claim to Strasbourg, under arts 8 and 14, supported 
by Rechtskomitee LAMBDA (RKL), Austria’s LGBT civil rights organisation. But in a 
fairly short judgment the Court, by five to two, found no breach of Article 14 read 
with 8, on the basis that, since they could marry, the applicants were not in a 
comparable situation to same-sex couples who had no right to marry in Austria and 
needed the registered partnership as an alternative means of providing legal 
recognition to their relationship. Thus the claim failed at the first hurdle under Article 
14: since no comparator was found, the Court did not need to assess the difference of 
treatment or the justification for the difference.  
 
The Court did not state that the need—accepted by the Austrian Constitutional 
Court—to be part of an historically disadvantaged group to attract strict scrutiny was 
required. It could have been noted that in any event, partly due to the patriarchal 
associations of marriage, their claim related to a rejection of a historical association 
between repression of women and marriage,89 and possibly to current discrimination 
against wives in Austria.  
 
Consensus analysis did not play a part in the ruling of the majority given that the 
claim failed at the comparator stage. If the question had been asked whether, where 
states had introduced same-sex registered partnerships, they had then maintained 
asymmetry of access as between different and same-sex couples in the fourth sense 
considered above, the answer would have been that such asymmetry was not usually 
maintained since in a majority of such states same-sex marriage was then introduced 
(and registered partnerships were usually phased out). A determination as to the width 
of the margin would have depended on the framing of the question as to consensus. 
Under strict scrutiny Austria’s justification for confining different-sex couples to one 
relationship status might not have been accepted. But the Court avoided that 
possibility because, it is argued, it could have encouraged, not only the opening of 
registered partnerships to different-sex couples in Austria, but eventually further 
challenges to bars to same-sex marriage in and from various member states.  
 
The decision failed to challenge the Court’s previous acceptance of creating 
segregation based on sexual orientation by corralling same-sex couples into the 
registered partnership ghetto, and different-sex couples into the civil marriage one. 
Had a breach of Article 14 read with 8 been found, and Austria had responded by 
opening registered partnerships to different-sex couples, the asymmetry of access to 
formalised relationship statuses in Austria as between same and different-sex couples 
would obviously have been exacerbated, placing same-sex couples in an even more 
disadvantaged position than was previously the case, a matter that the Court adverted 
to. However, in practice, given that the Court would then have rejected acceptance of 
such segregation, pressure would have been placed on Austria to open marriage to 
same-sex couples. The Court’s attempts at reform in this context have, as this decision 
confirms, been confined, albeit hesitantly, to addressing the situation of same-sex 
couples who have no access to any means of formalising their relationship. In other 
words, it is prepared at present to accept asymmetry of*E.H.R.L.R. 557 access in the 
fourth sense designated above as less pernicious in arts 14 and 8 terms than 
asymmetry in its first and most concerning sense. So doing also protects its own 
legitimacy.  
 
3.4 Asymmetry of access in Russia: Fedotova 
 
The implications of Oliari and Vallianatos may soon be considered in the context of a 
strengthened consensus on this matter, in Fedotova v Russia.90 Three same-sex 
couples are claiming a right to same-sex marriage in Russia, on the basis that only one 
form of formalisation of relationships is available in Russia—marriage—which is not 
open to same-sex couples. All three couples have declared their intention to marry 
and have applied unsuccessfully on a number of occasions to the Register Office 
locally to have their marriages registered. The requests were dismissed by reference to 
art.1 of the Russian Family Code, which states that the regulation of family 
relationships is based on "the principle of a voluntary marital union between a man 
and a woman". Their challenges to the Register Office’s decisions in the domestic 
courts were unsuccessful. 
 
The Strasbourg Court appears to be considering their claim under arts 8 and 14 only, 
not under art.12, and it is viewing it as a claim for some means of formalising their 
relationships in Russia via a form of registered partnership. The couples 
in Fedotova are not only subject to the most pernicious form of asymmetry of access 
identified above, but are also clearly in a particularly invidious position, given the 
context of state-based and social acceptance of homophobia potentially affecting their 
claim. Given that the Court in Oliari referred to a discordance between social reality 
in Italy and the legal position as to formalisation of a same-sex union as determinative 
of the reach of positive obligations under art.8, it accorded to itself the possibility, 
where such discordance did not exist, or did not exist to the same extent in a Member 
State, of avoiding a finding that the article had been breached. But by the time the 
case reaches the Court a stronger consensus as to providing access to same-sex 
registered partnerships in Member States, and as to rejecting asymmetry of access 
generally, will be apparent (and the consensus would be stronger if Steinfeld has been 
successful, and given the introduction of same-sex marriage in further member states 
by that point). In the face of a stronger consensus, the question would be whether the 
positive obligation recognised under art.8 in Oliari 91 could under fundamental ECHR 
principles be confined to the particular conditions operating in Italy,92 or whether it 
must be extended to Member States where those conditions—principally social 
acceptance of same-sex registered partnerships—do not operate. That appears to be 
the case in Russia. Failing to extend the obligation would mean in effect bowing to 
majoritarian opinion in order to deny a minority access to Convention rights. 
 
Further, the Court might be prepared to accept that the claim had a discriminatory 
aspect as in Taddeucci. If the Court was prepared to find that the situation fell within 
the ambit of art.8, art.14 would be engaged. Consensus analysis would then have a 
clearer role; assuming that the margin afforded would therefore be narrower than 
when Oliari was decided, the scrutiny under art.14 would be strict. The Court would 
therefore have less leeway to avoid finding a breach of art.14 read with art.8 in 
respect of Russia, especially since, as has been pointed out by the Court previously 
(in, for example, Alekseyev v Russia), the exercise of Convention rights by a minority 
cannot depend on their acceptance by the majority.*E.H.R.L.R. 558  93 
 
3.5 The potential impact of these challenges 
 
It can be seen that the stances of the Court of Appeal in England and of the Austrian 
Constitutional Court differed as to the role of the margin of appreciation doctrine 
domestically, since the English court found that it was inapplicable, meaning that 
strict scrutiny of the justification for the differentiation put forward was undertaken. 
The outcomes of the two claims would also lead to somewhat differing impacts in the 
two states if ultimately they are successful at Strasbourg (or in the UK Supreme 
Court). In England and Wales, if the claim eventually succeeds, it will confirm that 
discrimination in respect of relationship statuses based on sexual orientation cannot be 
condoned. Assuming that the government responds to a s.4 HRA declaration, by 
opening civil partnerships to different-sex couples, they, at least on a superficial 
analysis, would be the beneficiaries, but any remaining discrimination in the provision 
of civic benefits linked to such statuses would come under increased pressure, 
potentially benefiting same-sex couples also. More significantly, the decision would 
represent a denial that creating asymmetry of access on grounds of sexual orientation 
can be non-discriminatory, and would shore up the nature of the registered partnership 
model among Council of Europe states as an accepted and established method of 
formalising a relationship, potentially of benefit to same-sex couples in other 
contracting states, as discussed further below. 
 
The same effect would have been expected to arise in Austria if the claim 
in Ratzenböck had been successful at Strasbourg.94 But, more significantly, the 
campaign for equal access to formal relationship statuses would have been strongly 
bolstered, meaning that pressure to introduce same-sex marriage in Austria would be 
significantly increased. The outcome would have tended to undermine the appeal of 
the stance of the Conservative party in Austria, which reportedly disapproves of 
"marriage-lite" for different-sex couples as much or more than it disapproves of same-
sex marriage.95 
 
If the challenge in Fedotova is successful, it will become the leading decision on a 
right to a same-sex registered partnership under the ECHR, of more significance 
than Oliari, since it would not rest on recognition of a positive obligation under art.8 
that is potentially limited in scope. Russia would be likely to be slow to implement 
the ruling, but it would place pressure on those Eastern states maintaining the first, 
most pernicious and discriminatory form of asymmetry of access to formal 
relationship statuses. Where such states have already introduced Bills to introduce 
such partnerships, which have not been passed into law, encouragement to revisit 
them would be created. Eventually only an incrementally diminishing small number 
of contracting states might continue to maintain that form of asymmetry. 
 
4. Future successful challenges to asymmetry of access in domestic courts under 
the ECHR/constitutional rights’ guarantees? 
 
4.1 Less constraint in domestic courts? 
 
The possibility arises that art.8 read alone or with art.14 (or their domestic 
equivalents) might be more likely in certain states than at Strasbourg to be found to be 
breached domestically in respect of the four forms of asymmetry of access considered 
above. A same-sex couple could rely on those articles to challenge their exclusion 
from marriage or from any form of formalisation of their union in their own state. 
Clearly, a number of such actions have already arisen, as in, for example, the Italian 
litigation preceding the decision in Oliari, or the Russian litigation 
preceding Fedotova v Russia. As new challenges arise, on Steinfeld lines, but brought 
by same-sex couples, domestic courts, if prepared to subject the state justification 
to*E.H.R.L.R. 559  strict scrutiny, as occurred in Steinfeld, might not be prepared to 
accept that the demands of proportionality had been satisfied by claims that, for 
example, offering marriage only to different-sex couples could be justified on the 
basis of a need to protect traditional marriage.96 Successful action in domestic courts, 
finding that registered partnerships should be opened to same-sex couples or 
introduced, as in Vallianatos or Oliari, even if it does not lead to change in the state in 
question, is a factor the Strasbourg Court will take into account, as it expressly did 
in Oliari as relevant to finding a breach of art.8.97 
 
As far as the Supreme/Constitutional Courts in various states are concerned, it should 
not necessarily be relevant that a state might be found to be within its margin at 
Strasbourg (due to consensus analysis) in maintaining such asymmetry. Such Courts 
might find, as Baroness Hale found in the UK case of Re P, that "if the matter is 
within the margin of appreciation which Strasbourg would allow to us, then we have 
to form our own judgment".98 Clearly, the reception and status of the ECHR in 
domestic courts varies greatly as between the various Member States, and discussion 
of it is outside the scope of this article.99 But the margin of appreciation doctrine as an 
international law doctrine clearly has no place in domestic jurisprudence, except 
indirectly, as giving a domestic court greater leeway to decide on the scope and 
meaning of a Convention right—or its domestic equivalent—where the matter would 
be found by the Strasbourg Court to lie within the particular state’s margin. Domestic 
courts in the Member States are or could be less constrained than Strasbourg since 
obviously they are not affected by the subsidiarity doctrine and the policy-based need 
to exercise self-restraint on the basis of the possibility that their judgments might be 
disregarded in other Member States. Domestic courts can more readily take account 
of the principled basis for extending marriage to same-sex couples or the case for 
introducing or extending registered partnerships to same-sex couples, in terms of the 
value of offering an equal choice of forms of formalisation of the relationship to 
couples. 
 
Rights’ protection in certain (mainly Western) Member States in this context has 
already arisen via legislation, as discussed, and has already out-paced Strasbourg. But 
in so far as challenges to asymmetry of access are currently arising in domestic 
courts,100 and are relying on the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court, such courts 
also have the opportunity to outpace Strasbourg in creating a domestic fusion of 
family law and human rights values that demonstrates a more substantive 
understanding of the value of according equality of access to formal relationship 
statuses. In other words, when Strasbourg concepts are deployed domestically in 
Member States, they could be untrammelled by Strasbourg subsidiarity-based 
restraint, based partly on analysis of the consensus among the contracting states on 
the issue. 
 4.2 More value-laden judgments in domestic courts? 
 
At Strasbourg, in both Vallianatos and Oliari, the dignity-based argument found some 
recognition in the finding that formal civil unions have an "intrinsic value" for 
persons in the applicants’ position, even*E.H.R.L.R. 560  regardless of the legal 
effects they produce.101 But there has been a refusal to accept that disallowing an 
applicant in a relationship constituting "family life" to access marriage assails the 
dignity of a group if they are denied access to an institution providing a particular 
status, and of a high recognition value. If, as Bamforth argues in the context of 
defending formalisation of same-sex unions, there is a "dependence of equality on 
deeper values"102 then such values are clearly at stake in respect of creation of 
asymmetry of access to the detriment of same-sex couples. Protection for dignity has 
been found to underlie art.8 as an aspect of the "very essence of the 
Convention",103 while dignity has been found to form "the foundation of all the 
freedoms" protected by international human rights law104; it has been linked by the 
US Supreme Court to the obligation of the state not to deny marriage to a couple on 
the basis of sexual orientation.105 
 
The extent to which dignity is at stake in the context of extending civil partnerships to 
different-sex couples is perhaps more contestable,106 but the suggestion that dignity is 
undermined by denial of a choice as to partnership status on grounds of sexual 
orientation, even outside a general context of inequality, finds support from a range of 
sources.107 Even where the furtherance of equality is not part of a general drive to 
protect a discriminated-against minority group, those deeper values may still be at 
stake. Denying same-sex couples a right to marry, and confining them to the option of 
entering a registered partnership, assails their dignity by denying them a choice as to 
such status purely on grounds of their sexual orientation. The link to identity under 
art.8 receives some support from Mikuli? v Croatia 108: "[private life] can sometimes 
embrace aspects of an individual’s physical and social identity" and from Goodwin v 
United Kingdom in which art.8 was interpreted as protecting persons in establishing 
their "identity as individual human beings",109 in that case via official recognition of 
their new gender. A similar argument could be applied to the expression of the values 
held dear by a different-sex couple via the significant matter of the formal signalling 
of the nature of their relationship to others. The ability to express their identity as a 
couple via a non-inimical formalisation of the relationship thus not only provides 
civic benefits, but accords it a particular recognition, aligned with their beliefs. 
 
It is argued that the values of dignity, equality and identity are at stake when a couple 
on grounds of sexual orientation has open to them only one formal relationship status 
inimical to them, or, most significantly, is denied access to any formalisation of the 
relationship on those grounds. In principle, the "intrinsic value" of such formalisation 
is diminished where that status does not express their identity as a couple in terms of 
the way they present themselves to others. Goodwin, among other decisions, can be 
taken to indicate that the notion of protecting identity and gaining official recognition 
of a chosen identity is central under art.8(1).*E.H.R.L.R. 561  110 
 
4.3 Nature of domestic challenges 
 
If it was found domestically that the state did have an obligation to ensure symmetry 
of access as to formalisation of their relationship to same and different-sex couples 
under art.8, then under art.14 (or the domestic equivalents of these rights) the first test 
in the proportionality analysis would be to consider whether the means employed to 
pursue a legitimate aim appeared to be rationally connected to it or suitable to achieve 
it. Suitability of the means deployed in relation to the aim is also linked to the next 
stage in the analysis—choosing the measure to advance the aim which would create 
the least possible impairment of the rights interest, while serving more effectively to 
advance the aim. Extension of marriage to a same-sex couple or, as a first step 
towards symmetry of access, the introduction of registered partnerships for such a 
couple, or the opening of such partnerships to a different-sex couple, would appear to 
satisfy the demands of proportionality. Conversely, adoption of a "wait and see" 
approach (e.g. where a state was considering introducing same-sex marriage but had 
been very slow to take any positive steps towards it), or reliance on the value of 
maintenance of the status quo without a clear basis, other than an imprecise notion of 
defending "traditional marriage", would provide measures that would allow a non-
minimal invasion of the rights’ interest in question, probably for lengthy or indefinite 
periods. Scrutiny could be strict on the basis that most states now do not create full 
asymmetry of access, in the first sense discussed above. States could, however, 
achieve symmetry of access for couples by abolishing registered partnerships after 
same-sex marriage is introduced, as a number of them have done, the issue to which 
this article now turns. 
 
5 The detrimental impacts on same-sex couples of abolition of registered 
partnerships 
 
States must determine whether to abolish registered partnerships in the face of the 
introduction of same-sex marriage, or to introduce such partnerships as well as same-
sex marriage so as to provide two options to couples, regardless of sexual 
orientation.111 A number of states have taken the option of merely abolishing 
registered/civil partnerships completely once same-sex marriage is 
introduced.112 However, it need not be assumed that marriage is universally perceived 
to be the "gold standard" for formalisation of unions113; after the introduction of 
same-sex marriage in Member States, registered partnerships can still have a future as 
a means significant in their own right of effecting the public expression of a 
relationship, rather than being viewed as a mere stepping-stone to such marriage.114 
 
5.1 The intrinsic value of registered partnerships 
 
The points made above in relation to Steinfeld as to the detrimental impact on 
different-sex couples ideologically opposed to marriage of their inability to choose the 
registered/civil partnership status would also apply to same-sex couples who are 
equally opposed, if that ability was abolished.115 Indeed, it is argued that the 
detrimental impact might be greater. The position would be that some same and 
different-sex*E.H.R.L.R. 562  couples would continue to seek state formalisation and 
recognition of their relationship with the civic benefits thereby accruing, but would 
reject the marriage status as non-reflective of their relationship due to its patriarchal 
associations. But some same-sex couples might also view it as an institution reflective 
of heteronormativity and heterosexual mores.116 Abolition would mean that such 
couples would be denied state formalisation of their relationship on the basis of an 
(arguably) more deeply rooted ideological objection to marriage. But, conversely, if 
heterosexual couples enter a relationship status designed in effect for same-sex 
couples both are choosing a status non-modelled on heterosexual gender-based roles. 
The evidence from England and Wales is that civil partnerships are valued, 
particularly as a significant proportion of same-sex civil partners have not taken the 
option, available to them since December 2014, of conversion of their civil 
partnership to marriage.117 Further, same-sex partners wishing to enter a formal 
relationship status have not, since 2014, overwhelmingly opted for marriage.118 In 
other states in which same-sex marriage became available, same-sex couples did not 
overwhelmingly opt for marriage,119 and there is some evidence that this is especially 
true of older same-sex-couples, which120 may be attributable to the fact that their 
longer experience of legalised homophobia has created from their perspective an 
association between marriage and contempt for same-sex relations121 they find harder 
to overcome than do younger same-sex couples. In states in which different-sex 
couples are able to choose registered partnerships or marriage, a large number of them 
opt for registered partnerships.122 
 
5.2 The impact of abolition on existing registered partners 
 
Abolition would also have a strongly adverse impact on same-sex (and different-sex) 
couples already in a registered/civil partnership since their relationship status would 
then appear to have a diminished validity. Assuming that a number of them 
maintained their partnerships, after abolition they would become part of a steadily 
diminishing and, it is argued, ghettoised, group in a "legacy" relationship.123 Some 
partners would therefore decide to convert to marriage, but there would be an element 
of state coercion to do so involved if they would not have chosen conversion 
otherwise—and, as mentioned above, it appears that a number of them would not 
have done so.*E.H.R.L.R. 563  
 
Conclusions 
 
Strasbourg has gone so far as to recognise that rights-violations can arise if same-sex 
couples cannot access any form of formal relationship framework offering civic 
benefits broadly comparable to those offered by contracting marriage, although it has 
sought to place qualifications on that acceptance, based on local conditions, to be 
tested in Fedotova v Russia. It has therefore contemplated acceptance of the most 
pernicious and discriminatory form of asymmetry of access as to access to a formal 
relationship status available in the contracting states. It has also accepted that 
establishing partial symmetry of access in states (registered partnerships for same-sex 
couples, marriage for different-sex ones) is sufficient at present: it has not aspired to 
seeking to create full symmetry of access between couples. As discussed, its 
acceptance so far of the ghettoisation of formalisation of relationships based on sexual 
orientation as non-discriminatory is attributable to its position as an international 
court dependent on the doctrine of subsidiarity. 
 
It is undoubtedly the case that in the movement towards creation of symmetry of 
access in this matter among the contracting states, two key phases are apparent, 
affecting differing groups of states. First, and most significantly, in certain Eastern 
states the challenge is to rely on the ECHR to advance the cause of introducing same-
sex registered partnerships for the first time, creating the possibility that current 
complete asymmetry of access based on sexual orientation is incrementally rejected. 
Second, in those states which have already introduced registered partnerships, the 
challenge is to introduce same-sex marriage. These arguments rest on the impairment 
of equality values,124 and the assault on the dignity of same-sex couples as a group, 
that such forms of asymmetry entail. 
 
In furtherance of both those causes, this article has argued for rejection of asymmetry 
of access in Member States, where same-sex registered partnerships, and even same-
sex marriage, are already available. It has presented that argument on the basis that as 
further states move towards achievement of full or partial symmetry of access in this 
matter, the position of those Eastern states that have not yet introduced registered 
partnerships will be revealed as more starkly anomalous, but so will the anomaly of 
offering either same-sex or different-sex couples two options as to formalisation of 
relationships. Preservation of the registered partnership model in the face of same-sex 
marriage not only has the potential to affect consensus analysis at Strasbourg, 
narrowing the margin of appreciation for states refusing to accept symmetry of access, 
it also recognises the worth of that model as a particular conception of the public 
expression of a relationship, untainted by patriarchal or heteronormative values 
historically associated with the institution of marriage. 
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1. 
There is no clear consensus as to the states that make up "Eastern" Europe since 
definitions use differing parameters for inclusion, such as geographical territory, 
culture or membership of international/regional organisations. Cognisant of these 
variations, and that certain states may equally be classified as Central European, 
"Eastern" Member States of the Council of Europe will be taken to include: Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Moldova, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, the Czech 
Republic, the Slovak Republic. The Member States of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, 
Russia, Ukraine, Turkey are listed by some authorities as European, by others as 
Asian. For convenience the term, "Eastern" will be used to include these Member 
States also. 
2. 
See H. Fenwick, "Same Sex Unions at the Strasbourg Court in a Divided Europe: 
Driving Forward Reform or Protecting the Court’s Authority via Consensus Analysis" 
[2016] 3 E.H.R.L.R. 248 at 265, 268, as to the lived experiences of same-sex couples 
in certain Eastern states. 
3. 
That term is used as the commonly accepted one in the ECHR contracting states to 
denote formalised partnerships outside marriage. 
4. 
See H. Fenwick, "Same Sex Unions at the Strasbourg Court in a Divided Europe: 
Driving Forward Reform or Protecting the Court’s Authority via Consensus Analysis" 
[2016] 3 E.H.R.L.R. 248, 250–252 and H. Fenwick, "Enhanced subsidiarity and a 
dialogic approach or appeasement in recent cases on Criminal Justice, Public Order 
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